Ethereum EIP-1559 may not be stable.

As Ethereum passed other public-private partnerships due to its high oil prices,PEB-1559The launch of the company aroused public interest and enthusiasm. It is understood that the issuance of ETH has been reduced by 68% since the release of EIP-1559, resulting in a loss of 1.48 million ETH. It has also been hailed as one of the largest in Ethereum history.

However, at the same time, discussions about the uncertainty of EIP-1559 began to unfold, and it is still recognized that the lifetime of EIP-1559 poses more risks than benefits. In fact, EIP-1559 does not solve the problem of high oil prices. From an economic point of view, the way to reduce oil prices is to increase them because the level of oil prices depends on the relationship between market demand and supply. But what does the other EIP-1559 mean? This section describes some of the shortcomings of EIP-1559.

This section describes the performance of the EIP-1559 using the preferred fuel cost. With EIP-1559, the transition includes new fields and is included in the new mode. Instead of specifying a specific fuel price, the price is set according to the miner's instructions (known as a "preferred price") which determines the maximum fuel cost to be paid and how many people work to pay a higher price than fuel. The instructions must be good so that the price of fuel to be paid is always greater than or equal to the price of gasoline. In commercial operations, the total cost (equivalent to the cost of using fuel) is divided into two parts. The base price is burned and the miner's tip price is paid to miners in the block.

While most blockchain processes require the bottom coin to be destroyed, it often punishes one party for corruption. When dishonest people take advantage, the bad party can blame themselves so they don't get blamed by others. In this settlement, the two-party process always leads to burning coins, no matter who criticized them. However, in the case of EIP-1559, the tokens can be reclaimed if the same transaction that destroyed them occurs in a different order or time. Like MEV, tokens can be traded if all participants can participate.

Here are the short-term incentives for protocol participants.

Miners want to get more money from consumers or lower fuel prices.

Consumers often want to pay less by lowering or reducing fuel prices.

Passive users need more tokens to burn and the price of their tokens increases as lower fuel prices are higher.

All organizations are actively benefiting from lower fuel prices. The main problem is that the combination of active users and miners to reduce the cost of fuel is difficult to achieve. Disputes include: (1) two anonymous and powerful groups, (2) multiple clients, (3) mediation requires prior or due process to spend money, and (4) protesters can intervene. 5) The rest of the users can take advantage of this situation to trade lower prices and increase base oil prices without joining the partnership.

Although EIP.-1559 had dropped the modification, EIP would not have seen the main incentives available today to reduce the cost of gas. Today, the key figure is to reduce oil prices by less than 6%. This means that miners can earn 16 times more through their exchange rate by reducing their starting price. Eric Voskuil's book on the crypto industry explains that exchange rates are the cost of denied censorship and Ethereum now pays too little for it. This means, at least in theory, that any business can be easily disrupted. Market restrictions pushed oil prices below zero and miners' earnings rose further as exchange rates traded higher.

When the base oil price drops to zero, users and miners can allocate their savings 50/50 for future trading. Users trade at 50% off, but miners get 8 times the exchange rate. As a result, wages were increased by 50% as the cost of wages (non-flammable and non-flammable) was equal to the benefit. Due to electricity and other operating costs, the miner's revenue is only a small part of the rewards, and although 50% of new revenue is shared with users, revenue from these new acquisitions can represent a 300% increase in revenue. This clearly indicates that the situation is not very stable. EIP-1559 would be the last game if only the Ethereum blockchain could be reconciled between the two groups, or if the exchange could be shut down.

If the price of oil below the market magically falls to zero by a very good combination, many consumers will try to bargain, bringing the exchange rate back to the same level. However, with the cooperation of miners, oil prices can stay at zero forever. Miners will have a stable income which is 400% higher than before.

This article shows several ways (some of which are cheaper) to reduce by adjusting fuel prices below. Some relationships between these processes may not be perfect and complete at first, but in most cases the inconveniences will only get worse. Perfect people unite to achieve goals. The only multi-pronged approach available to achieve reconciliation represents the current weak state of the Ethereum network in EIP-1559.

The research presented in this article is clearly not an analysis of the value of Ethereum portfolio management. The wallet, like the previous EIP-1559 wallet, is expected to adapt to lower oil prices and revert to further increases to ensure a smooth transition. However, wallets can use own checks to ensure that old values ​​no longer work. For an in-depth analysis, you should refer to the rules of most existing wallets to see if the EIP-1559 wallet package complies with the restrictions to protect information provided through oil prices.

Equally important, the tighter the PoS integration, the higher the support for PoW miners to become autonomous and integrated.

"Classic" minor modification to 51% without resistance

most of usmine man(called 60% hash rate) We are happy to work with you to reduce the cost of gasoline. We call them Coordinated Majority Votes (MC). CM has the ability to increase or decrease the fuel consumption limit, and the first modification uses this feature.

EIP-1559 compared the presence of the CM group to 51% resistance. But this is not true. The classic 51% miner attack is to remove blocks from the miner miner to get the most out of most miners. In CM, most miners give rewards to a few. For minors, it's the tip of the iceberg, free. From the miners' point of view, all miners were encouraged to cooperate with the CMs after the incident even if they did not join the CMs for political reasons.

This is the first way to circumvent the oil price control process. The current block gas limit is 30M gas. If 60% of the miners created blocks that consumed 15 million oil and the other miners collected up to 120 million oil, that equals the equivalent of 57 million oil per block. Since the block gas limit of the BSC chain is 80M and will fill some blocks, we can expect oil demand to be met by this demand. So if CM decides to increase the fuel block limit by 4x to 120M and CM limits the fuel consumption in its own block to 15M, all miners win. This is true even if lower fuel prices are inversely proportional to an increase in throughput.

To explain why these strategies are beneficial to all miners, we find that not all CM blocks increase fuel prices by 12.5% ​​(the highest rank increase is allowed by the process) if some use all the oil contained in the block can . . Each CM block goal of 15 million fuels will reduce fuel costs by 10.9%. As CM operates 60% of the block, lower fuel costs also decrease due to the result. You need 190 blocks to reduce fuel costs by 90%.

Strikes require preparation time and CM raises the fuel limit to 120M, which takes 1422 blocks (about 6 hours). In the short term, communities will not have time to fix its answers, much less a challenge. However, it is unclear what will happen when the fuel system expands. At the planning stage, if demand does not match the supply chain, net oil prices will fall. Only an increase in supplies can cause the price of base oil to be zero and the instructions to be reduced as well, resulting in reduced rewards for miners. CM may view this as an investment in future returns, but today the cost of "investing" Ethereum (6 hours of earnings) can be as high as $800,000. However, we will present a better partnership.

Minor adjustment for 51% brake

Suppose the limit is increased to 120M gas, but if CM releases orphan blocks (51% "strike") by non-CM miners who consume more than 15M gas, only 24 blocks are used to save costs fuel. 10% of the original price. To avoid an orphan war with other miners, CM= assigns all miners a one-line code patch (possibly modified) in advance to limit miners to 15 million blocks.

The end result is that if the fuel limit is increased to 120 million in 6 hours, the network will be limited to 15 million blocks of gas, and each miner can double their income by collecting 2 or more ETH added from each block. .

Third meeting

The goal of EIP-1559 is to fill all blocks up to 50% except when demand is high. One of the elements of EIP-1559 is that all trash is empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty, empty , empty,. ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss between empty blocks and the total of 300 times (~ 1.25 t) EEV), oil prices have begun to climb 10% of their original value. It is not necessary that 100% of the miners decide to create a solid waste. If only 30% of miners produce solid waste, you can see that the initial oil cost will be reduced by 50% after 300 blocks, then by 90% after 1000 blocks (~4 hours) and most miners won't have any no need.

When all miners collected less than 47% of the blocks, base oil prices also fell and increased by 10% after 316 blocks, but production fell slightly by 1.5%.

Separate points for compensation of miners for temporary loss due to empty mining gap are before 1.25 hours. Only 40% of miners participate, and in just 15 minutes (60 blocks), the base fuel cost can be reduced by 20%, which is enough to cover the gap loss. A decline in oil prices has occurred.

We will now invite third parties to help us along the way. Imagine a secret agent named Charles ready to invest in the gift of creating empty space for 15 minutes, give everyone a gift for the loss of creating empty space and add an additional 10% bonus. Assuming there are blocks every 15 seconds, Charles' maximum value is equal to the instruction he can pay at 60 blocks (30 tips for empty devs) equals 1.1 to provide funding additional. Let's say ether cost is $3200/ether, each block has 2.12 ether, user pays cost, of which 2 ether is burned.

Assuming Charles uses his average tip over the past 15 minutes as a benchmark, his investment would be $13,000. With only 40% involvement and market share to limit gas supply by raising the price, in just 15 minutes all miners get a total of $40,000 in value, against the Worried Heat. 40% of participants receive an additional $16,000.

Charles may, but is not obligated to accept, chain donations to create incentives to support even mining models.

Charles can say that the bounty is only paid out if less than 40% of participants are involved in digging a bin. This means that miners never lose money. They take advantage of Charles or give gifts to consumers who display a higher price of oil. The most likely outcome is to join a miner, so Charles can save some money and reuse it elsewhere. Once the miners realized their ability to drive down fuel prices, even Charles left, the miners would continue to mine me empty-handed with the new Schelling concept! The downs have begun.

Smart bond reconciliation

If the new Schelling cannot be reached, or if you cannot believe that a third party can cooperate with it, it shows that the power of smart contracts can achieve the same goal. We bring the Charles party to the miners for an open and secure contract. Let's say you are the author. Miners interact directly with Gatherer without depending on other external organizations. As long as the miner understands the contract, each miner can develop a vaccine and increase their income.

Obviously, it is possible to create a Gatherer from Ethereum that uses the BLOCKHASH opcode to get the hash of a block that has existed for more than 15 minutes in the past. Authors should encourage users or miners to submit all block header files to the Gatherer contract, and Gatherer will ensure that these files match the block hash securely. The block header allows the entrepreneur to learn all the information about previous blocks, find the miners who created the dump, and reward them accordingly. Hash analysis is simple because the hash root change matches the test hash. After all, collaboration is the advantage of Ethereum.

Gatherer can easily decide to pay the fee or take an extra 15 minutes, so the most likely outcome is that Gatherer only needs an initial investment of $13,000 that will last forever. Donations and time savings may be extended if additional time is required to complete additional information due to low fuel consumption. This is a configuration problem, not a practical problem.

Reconciliation between minor minors and individuals

One of the requirements of EIP-1559 is that it allows users to better estimate exchange rates and without overpaying. But at the same time, simple oil prices should adjust to the crash. It is now possible for oil prices to increase by 100% per day.

Excellent volatility allows users to trade consistent value with miners. As we will show, the mining pool, which we call Mina, can offer users a lower cost by digging the rocks while generating huge revenue. EIP-1559 raises the issue and ignores it. Miners who are not mine are involved in Mina's plans. However, our simulation shows that this is not the case.

This is how Mina does business. Mina offers its customers a fair contract, called Mina "the consumer". Items are up to the deadline set by the blockchain, and only consumers agree to be penalized if they try to double use the exchange before the deadline.

The penalty machine is made by a smart contract we called Penelope. The assets deposited by a single consumer are approximately equal to the value of the two Penelope shares. When a user submits a commercial T' to Mina with a non-N, he also signs a request M not to create two applications T' before the deadline D. must be signed if: "Nonce N is reserved for the exchangeII(T) up to block D." The private market T represents the highest price (ie 3%) lower than the current gas price negotiated between the consumer and Mina. When a private user uses nonce N twice, Mina submits a certificate to Penelope and receives a reward. Mina consumers are more likely to be major cryptocurrency exchanges.

Mina is now free to list as many private label variations as possible through other users of the same code. If Mina had written enough pledges (i.e. she could have written all the blocks), it would have meant that she had eliminated the oil she would consume from the market and fewer blocks would be written. Starting oil prices are even lower. First Mina mines empty blocks.

Currently, at Ethereum, the average deposit is less than 6% of the price of kerosene. To simplify the explanation, assume that the base fuel value is 100 tokens and the average fuel value is 6 tokens. Mina's private label customers pay her about 103 tokens (about 3% less than 106), but the instructions are about 15.5 tokens (more than 6 tokens). Mina cannot abuse these personal changes. Indeed, this does not apply to blocks with a fuel cost of 100. Mina will be waiting for you. Let's say all blocks are halved and the floor price of oil is stable. Say your block has a fuel limit of 30 fuel units. Now we explain how Mina can benefit from these private contracts by digging a hole.

After Mina completes all the blocks in the market, she starts mining empty blocks. Each time he widens the base fuel price is reduced by 12.5% ​​and the fuel price starts at 87.5 coins. If you mine a mine, it completely fills the block with 30M fuel, so it gets 15.5*30 = 465 tokens. Each time he mines an empty slot, he drops around 6 * 15 = 90 tokens. This means that as long as Mina can build 2 blocks together every 5 blocks, it will be profitable.

A miner with a 45% hashrate would typically mine two blocks in a row instead of every fifth block. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that most miners should benefit from lower fuel costs, as this shows that 45% of miners can benefit.

Here we think that after a while, there will be a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people, a lot of people. sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss empty If all the fuel has been consumed, the idea of ​​Mina could result in a loss of constant value. of the oil fund, while all costs remain the same for the benefit of all miners. What happens in practice depends on how you budget your money to increase your information during a proven delay.

The impact of Mina's strategy on its users (those who do not have a personal agreement with Mina) has not yet been measured. Knowing Mina's idea, consumers who want to trade can wait for the block to be developed, which reduces fuel costs, then announce the changes immediately, compete for the lowest cost block and set the highest value. low. Using the numbers from the previous example, one possibility is flipping 10 chips, with a maximum value of 100 and completing 6 chips. These strategies are beneficial for all miners, including Mina. After the vacuum, the miners almost doubled their income. Their goal is therefore to always protect Mina, even if they are not part of it.

Autonomous mining and EIP-1559

Miners who want to pre-sell their block but don't want white runners to follow their blocks cannot try to enter the mining industry to build two private blocks together and advertise together. If this fails, the first block is opened and then counted by the uncle's setting, losing at least 1/8 of the grant block. Moving 80% of current oil prices to key data means mining may be a viable option for miners with high hashrate costs due to the cost provided by revenue more than benefits. Similarly, if oil prices begin to decline, base oil prices could fall to zero.

After EIP-1559 PoS "Merge"

One of the problems with EIP-1559 in the Ethereum PoS consensus is that miners know in advance when they can mine two blocks together. The miners could sell the block below the average fuel price, and when it did, they turned me into 2 blocks together, they mined the empty blocks, then leased the blocks. Due to the openness of choice leaders, Ethereum PoS makes it easy for miners to collaborate with previous or future miners to reduce fuel costs.

daws

I haven't found the best solution to support the EIP-1559 issue. The solution we need is to simply burn part of the starting price (i.e. 20%) and give the rest to the miners. This is the favorite minor lake.

Some changes can reduce the motivation for peace. The simplest fix is ​​to reduce the base oil price change rate from 12.5%/block to 3%/block, but this changes the properties of EIP-1599 to warn users of congestion. However, long-term changes caused by smart promises cannot be prevented. Another solution is to set the volume limit to 30M (many EIPs try this).

EIP-1559 cannot save without reducing the cost of food, because EIP-1559 reduces the cost of inspection below the level received. Time will tell if EIP-1559 is stable or not stable. A large community of mining personnel can reduce the risk, although there is no need to circumvent EIP-1559.

concludes

EIP-1559 is intended to serve the Ethereum community, especially passive Ethereum holders, but we believe it is not stable. Only one penalty is needed to make a change that repeats EIP-1559 to its previous state when all participants can benefit from reconciliation and low peace cost. A set of events can be quickly changed for the new assembly to eliminate the old process.gasthe price. The root of the problem is that oil prices could fluctuate due to changes in censorship, and Ethereum's censorship cost has become very low. With an average of 15 million per block, the cost of restricted trading at Ether is currently only $77,000 per hour.

In this free form, we show you six different ways to achieve co-op in the unlikely event that some players betray, but co-op can be changed. It also shows how to use the Ethereum integration capabilities of smart contracts to improve the efficiency of EIP-1559 removal. The fact that EIP-1559 benefits the weak user and makes the weak user makes it unstable because the weak user will not have to worry about the state of the blockchain when they start working together to eliminate EIP-1559.